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DOES CANADA NEED A 
POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
DOCTRINE? 
D. Geoffrey Cowper, Q.C.* 
Lorne Sossin** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The steady march of controversial issues onto the Supreme Court docket 
continues to bewilder, confound and amaze observers. The challenging and 
compelling character of the claims made before the Court, and the breadth of 
possible judicial responses, has made the search for limiting institutional prin-
ciples both timely and controversial. The debate over the proper reach of the 
Court’s jurisdiction is an important and a delicate task. While a number of 
critics lament the Court’s foray into the policy arena, many appear motivated 
primarily by disagreement with the outcome of the Court’s judgments.1 
There are, however, legitimate points for debate concerning the Court’s defi-
nition of constitutional rights, as well as its determination of available judicial 
remedies for unconstitutional conduct. The difficulty, as always, lies in distin-
guishing between questions which the courts must resolve, no matter how 
politically sensitive, and those cases where the judiciary should decline to 
address the issue on the basis that it is not a proper question for adjudication by 
the courts.2  
                                                                                                                                                              
* Mr. Cowper received his Bachelor of Laws Degree from the University of British Colum-
bia in 1980 and was admitted to the British Columbia Bar in 1982. He received his Q.C. in 1997 
and is a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers. 
** Professor Sossin joined the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto in 2002, where he 
teaches courses in public law, social justice and legal process. Prior to this appointment, he was a 
member of Osgoode Hall Law School’s full-time faculty (1999-2001), and the Department of 
Political Science at York University (1997-2001). 
1 
 For example, see Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial (2001); Morton and Knopff, The 
Charter Revolution & The Court Party (2000); and the review of this book by Sossin, Courting the 
Right (2000), 38 Osgoode Hall L. J. 531-41. See also Bayda C.J., Saskatchewan’s, speech at the 
Act of Settlement Conference, Spring 2001, Vancouver, for a spirited defence of the Court’s 
Charter jurisprudence: British Columbia Superior Courts 
<http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/1701/welcome.htm> (date accessed: April 9, 2002). 
2
  There are a number of doctrines aside from political questions which might prompt the 
Court to decline jurisdiction, including ripeness, mootness or a lack of standing. For a discussion of 
justiciability in this wider sense, see Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of 
Justiciability in Canada (1999). On the relationship between political questions and justiciability 
more directly, see Tremblay, Les tribunaux et les questions politiques — Les limites de la 
justiciabilite (1999). 
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While the Court has in different contexts expressly recognized the impor-
tance of staying within the judicial role contemplated under the Canadian Con-
stitution (most notably reiterating that it is not the province of the Court to 
second-guess the wisdom of legislation or government action), we will argue 
that it has not yet established clear and transparent principles either in the ex-
pression of that role or its application. In this paper, we divide our analysis into 
the following three sections. First, we offer a definition of a political questions 
doctrine and summarize the experience in the United States dealing with a 
similar exercise in seeking to develop a political questions doctrine. The body 
of case law in the United States concerning political questions is potentially 
valuable as an example of how a similarly situated judiciary has come to grips 
with the judicial response to political controversies. In the second section, we 
seek to extract from the American experience lessons which might be applica-
ble to Canada, with appropriate accommodation for our distinctive jurispruden-
tial traditions and Constitution. Finally, in the third section, we examine the 
Canadian experience and review the Court’s position with respect to political 
questions as evidenced in its recent judicial work.  
II. THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION 
It may be useful to define what is meant in this context by a “political ques-
tion.” Although the term has been used in many different ways, for our pur-
poses we take it to mean the following: A question which arises in litigation 
and which by express or implied constitutional principle is excluded from 
judicial determination and left for resolution by other organs of government. A 
political question may dominate the case before the Court or merely form an 
aspect of the controversy. In the Charter context, political questions may cir-
cumscribe the Court’s elaboration of a Charter right, or may animate the 
Court’s approach to section 1.3 Similarly, in some circumstances, a political 
question may only arise in the context of the Court’s selecting an appropriate 
remedy for breach of an established constitutional right.  
It bears emphasizing that many cases raise controversies which may be “po-
litical” in the broadest sense of the term, but do not concern political questions 
in the sense meant here. The most difficult problem of definition arises when 
the Court rules on the scope of constitutional rights. Since the Constitution is 
the “supreme law” of Canada, its interpretation and application falls to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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courts to adjudicate.4 The recent decision in United States v. Burns,5 which we 
discuss below, represents an example of a Charter case which squarely raises 
concerns over the political questions doctrine. However, in this case, as in 
others which bear on the boundaries of judicial intervention, the Court fails to 
articulate the values or criteria which guide its judgments in relation to political 
questions.  
Even in a case such as the 1998 Secession Reference,6 where the Court 
crafted Solomon-like political compromises on the clarity of referendum ques-
tions and majorities — and the duty to negotiate the Court declined to address 
its political role directly. The Court suggested that it was engaged only in ap-
plying the relevant standards of constitutional and international law. While the 
Court clearly operates with a political questions doctrine in mind, it has yet to 
find a coherent voice for articulating that doctrine.7 Inferences from what the 
Court actually does is not conclusive in such a complex area. What is clear in 
our view is that simple characterizations do not serve the need to delineate the 
important boundary between judicial decision making and legislative debate 
and policy determination.  
III. THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 
The American doctrine has its origins in the early cases which developed the 
scope of judicial review implied by the terms of the U.S. Constitution and the 
continuing tension created by the Jeffersonian ideal of a constitution upheld by 
an informed and active citizenry. 
Based on the principle of the separation of powers, the political questions 
doctrine limits judicial jurisdiction, and therefore power, in a number of cir-
cumstances where the other branches of government have a stronger claim to 
decide the issue raised. It must be remembered that the very legitimacy of 
judicial review of legislation on constitutional grounds was not expressly ad-
dressed in the United States Constitution. Indeed, it was Jefferson’s view, 
                                                                                                                                                              
4
  See Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at 472, per Wilson J., and 459, 
per Dickson J. (as he then was). 
5
  [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. 
6
  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [“Secession Reference”]. 
7
  The closest the Court came to such an articulation in the Secession Reference was its 
summary of the circumstances under which the Court may decline to answer a reference question 
on the basis of “non-justiciability”, which were held to include: 
(i)  if to do so would take the Court beyond its own assessment of its proper role in the con-
stitutional framework of our democratic form of government; or 
(ii)  if the Court could not give an answer that lies within its area of expertise: the interpreta-
tion of law (ibid., at para. 26). 
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successfully defeated by John Marshall, that the legislatures must be trusted 
themselves to avoid exceeding their constitutional powers, with the sole remedy 
being the democratic sanction of an electorate determined to keep the constitu-
tional division of authority respected.8  
The doctrine first arose in Luther v. Borden,9 a case arising out of the Dorr 
rebellion, a domestic uprising in the state of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court, 
having been asked to recognize the Dorr regime as the legal government at the 
time of the dispute, stated: 
Undoubtedly the courts of the United States have certain powers under the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States which do not belong to the State courts. But the 
power of determining that a State government has been lawfully established, which 
the courts of the State disown and repudiate, is not one of them. Upon such a ques-
tion the courts of the United States are bound to follow the decisions of the State 
tribunals.10 
But while federal courts had no jurisdiction over the question, neither did the 
state courts:  
[W]e do not see how the question [of which government is legitimate] could be 
tried and judicially decided in a State court. Judicial power presupposes an estab-
lished government capable of enacting laws and enforcing their execution, and of 
appointing judges to expound and  
administer them. The acceptance of the judicial office is a recognition of the au-
thority of the government from which it is derived. And if the authority of that gov-
ernment is overthrown, the power of its courts and other officers is annulled with it. 
And if a State court should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this case, and should 
come to the conclusion that the government under which it acted had been put aside 
and displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court, and be in-
capable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try.11  
The Supreme Court went on to identify the authority through which the dispute 
can be addressed:  
[T]he Constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided for an emergency 
of this kind, and authorized the general government to interfere in the domestic 
concerns of a State, has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the 
power in the hands of that department.12 
                                                                                                                                                              
8
  Smith, John Marshall, Definer of a Nation (1996), at 465-67.  
9
  48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
10
  Ibid., at 40. 
11
  Ibid., at 39-40. 
12
  Ibid., at 42. 
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More than a century later, the doctrine expressed in Luther was given its 
modern expression and form in Baker v. Carr,13 a dispute over legislative ap-
portionment in Tennessee. Although no “political question” was identified in 
the substance of the case by the majority, Brenner J. identified the characteris-
tics of a political question:  
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.14 
Rather than a comprehensive statement of principle, this summarizes various 
bases which would lead to a decision not to decide a particular question. Law-
rence Tribe has proposed that three separate models emerge from this passage: 
the Classical model, consisting of the first clause; the Functional model, being 
the sum of the second and third clauses; and the Prudential model, consisting of 
the final three clauses.15  
Since we are only concerned with the potential for lessons from the Ameri-
can experience, it is sufficient to observe that these different principles include 
notions of express textual assignment, appropriateness of judicial methodology, 
and, finally, deference to other branches of government. As we will see, in the 
Canadian experience each of these themes has been advanced and considered, 
but in piecemeal fashion, without being recognized as elements of a coherent 
doctrine.  
A review of some of the U.S. case law in which these considerations have 
been present illuminates the concerns over assignment, appropriateness and 
deference. One of the most forceful proponents of judicial deference (and of the 
Prudential model) to elected bodies, Felix Frankfurter, wrote in Colegrove v. 
Green, a decision later overturned by Baker v. Carr, that: 
We are of the opinion that the petitioners ask of this Court what is beyond its com-
petence to grant. This is one of those demands on judicial power which cannot be 
met by verbal fencing about “jurisdiction.” It must be resolved by considerations on 
the basis of which this Court, from time to time, has refused to intervene in contro-
versies. It has refused to do so because due regard for the effective working of our 
                                                                                                                                                              
13
  369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
14
  Ibid., at 217. 
15
  Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed, 1988), at 96. 
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government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore 
not meet for judicial determination.16  
In Baker v. Carr itself, Frankfurter J. expanded on his Jeffersonian theme in 
dissent: 
In this situation, as in others of like nature, relief does not belong here. Appeal 
must be to an informed, civically militant electorate. In a democratic society like 
ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that scars the con-
science of the people’s representatives.17  
After Frankfurter J. left the Court, the Prudential model faded from the re-
ports until another apportionment case came before the Supreme Court, this 
time disputing a political gerrymander in Indiana. Justice O’Connor, writing in 
a concurrence with Burger L.J. and Rehnquist J.R. in Davis v. Bandemer, stated 
that 
the legislative business of apportionment is fundamentally a political affair, and 
challenges to the manner in which an apportionment has been carried out — by the 
very parties that are responsible for this process — present a political question in 
the truest sense of the term . . . To turn these matters over to the federal judiciary is 
to inject the courts into the most heated partisan issues . . . I do not believe, and this 
Court offers not a shred of evidence to suggest, that the Framers of the Constitution 
intended the judicial power to encompass the making of such fundamental choices 
about how this Nation is to be governed.18 
In Coleman v. Miller,19 the importance of a constitutional foundation for a 
judicial rule was considered in the context of a judicial determination of a time 
limit for the ratification of a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
“Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial determination? None are 
to be found in the Constitution or statute.”20  
The Functional model, which is concerned with the appropriateness of judi-
cial method to the problem raised, occasionally emerges as a subsidiary reason 
in a ruling decided primarily on Classical model grounds, as in Gilligan v. 
Morgan,21 a case regarding the regulation of the National Guard:  
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of government action 
that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches, directly re-
sponsible — as the Judicial Branch is not — to the elective process. Moreover, it is 
                                                                                                                                                              
16
  328 U.S. 549 (1946), at 552. 
17
  Supra, note 13, at 270. 
18
  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), at 145. 
19
  307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
20
  Ibid., at 453. 
21
  413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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difficult to conceive of an area of government activity in which the courts have less 
competence.22  
The Classical model (i.e., the existence of an express constitutional assign-
ment to a non-judicial body) has been, by a substantial degree, the most often 
applied form of the political questions doctrine. The Classical model has been 
responsible for, among others, the rulings in Luther v. Borden, Pacific States 
Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon,23 Gilligan v. Morgan, and Nixon v. United 
States.24 In fact, for all cases decided on the basis of a political question, the 
Classical model has been the sole or dominant consideration. Typical of this 
type of reasoning is that reflected in Chicago & Southern Air Lines Inc. v. 
Waterman Steamship Corp.,25 dealing with discretionary foreign affairs deci-
sions:  
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign 
affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be 
published to the world . . . [E]ven if courts could require full disclosure, the very 
nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such de-
cisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the 
government, Executive and Legislative.26  
Most recently, in Bush v. Gore,27 the application of the political questions 
doctrine arose in a pointed and interesting fashion. Although there is vast scope 
for legal and political debate over Bush v. Gore and the reasonableness of the 
majority or minority opinions, for the present purposes the concurring opinion 
is of the greatest interest. In the decision by Rehnquist C.J., Scalia J. and Tho-
mas J. concurring, those three concurring judges founded their opinion on the 
basis that the State Supreme Court’s judgment respecting the recount removed 
the question of the selection of electors for president and vice-president from 
the legislature to a judicially directed process overseen by the State Supreme 
Court. In support of an order which vacated the State Court’s conclusion as to 
how a recount was to be managed, the concurring judges stated, “This enquiry 
does not imply a disrespect for State courts but rather a respect for the constitu-
tionally prescribed role of State legislatures.”28  
In the unusual circumstances of that case, the self-limiting doctrine was used 
to support a judicial order which vacated a State Supreme Court judgment 
                                                                                                                                                              
22
  Ibid., at 9. 
23
  223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
24
  506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
25
 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
26
  Ibid., at 111. 
27
  148 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2000). 
28
  Ibid., at 405. 
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which it was concluded would have had the effect of taking away the State 
legislature’s constitutional power to direct the selection of electors for president 
and vice-president. 
In view of the controversy following that decision, a political questions doc-
trine clearly does not do away with debate and controversy. Indeed, the fact that 
reliance on the doctrine was had only by three members of the Court concurring 
in the result may indicate the lack of appeal of the approach for some, particu-
larly on hotly debated political issues. 
As already noted, what is most useful for Canadian purposes is that the 
American case law recognizes three principles relevant to political questions. 
They are: 
 
1. The text of the constitution may expressly or implicitly require the ex-
clusion of any judicial role in the resolution of a controversy (“Constitu-
tional Assignment”). 
2. The judicial method may be inappropriate because the character of the 
issue is not amenable to resolution by judicially discoverable principles, 
or turns on the selection of a policy unsuitable for judicial decision 
(“Judicial Appropriateness”). 
3. The advisability in certain circumstances of withholding judicial reme-
dies so as to avoid interference with the operations of the political 
branches of government (“Deference”). 
 
Each of these principles has found judicial support in the Canadian context, 
which is not surprising given the federal nature of both systems with a similar 
constitutional protection for individual rights. It is also not surprising that Brit-
ish jurisprudence has not had to struggle as much with these issues given its 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty and unitary constitutional government.29  
These are not isolated principles, but are by their character inter-related and 
may be engaged in different ways in the same case.  
                                                                                                                                                              
29
  However, that is not to say prudential concerns over the scope of judicial review have not 
arisen in the U.K. context. See, for example, Chandler v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] 3 
All E.R. 142 (H.L.) and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister of Civil Service, [1984] 3 All 
E.R. 935 (H.L.). For other commonwealth perspectives, see Lindell, “The Justiciability of Political 
Questions: Recent Developments” in Lee and Winterton (eds.), Australian Constitutional Perspec-
tives (1992). 
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IV.  CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
1. General  
A Canadian political questions doctrine already exists, although not labelled 
or acknowledged as such.30 The established boundaries of the Canadian princi-
ple are parallel to the classical doctrine in the United States: namely, that where 
the Constitution assigns the resolution of a controversy to another branch of 
government, judicial interference will be refused. Where, for example, constitu-
tional amendment processes are concerned, the courts have declined to impose 
judicially defined standards of fairness or procedure. 
On the other hand, attempts to apply the notion of the inappropriateness of 
judicial method or deference to other branches of government in relation to 
political questions have been rejected without much dissent. In Operation 
Dismantle Inc. v. R.,31 where the American doctrine was expressly argued, 
Wilson J. declined to give it any weight where the question involved the appli-
cation for an injunction to stop cruise missile testing in Canada.32 However, she 
went on in the same judgment to recognize that an issue will be non-justiciable 
if it involves “moral and political considerations which it is not within the 
province of the courts to assess.”33 In this fashion, while rejecting the American 
political questions doctrine per se, she is sometimes credited with founding the 
Canadian version of this doctrine in the very same judgment. A further irony is 
that while Wilson J. was writing a concurring judgment considering the politi-
cal questions doctrine, the majority in the case dismissed Operation Disman-
tle’s claim on the basis that the allegations of breach of Charter rights could 
never be proven — which is to say that the evidence required to sustain the 
claim was inherently political and was not judicially cognizable.34  
                                                                                                                                                              
30
  In Boundaries of Judicial Review, supra, note 2, at 145-200, the following settings were 
identified as judicially circumscribed on grounds that the matter at issue was political in nature or 
assigned to a political branch to adjudicate: 
(i) disputes over the legislative process; 
(ii) disputes involving constitutional conventions; 
(iii) disputes regarding parliamentary privileges and Crown prerogatives; 
(iv) disputes involving intergovernmental relations; 
(v) disputes involving social and economic rights; and  
(vi) disputes involving the enforcement of international agreements. 
31
 Supra, note 4. 
32
  Ibid., at 472. 
33
  Ibid., at 465. 
34
  Ibid., at 459. The evidence in question related to the then Soviet Union’s military policy. 
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Despite the apparent rejection of the U.S. doctrine in Operation Dismantle 
Inc. v. R., however, there are many cases in which the Canadian courts have 
acknowledged the necessity of declining to act. What is missing are clearly 
stated and satisfactory principles to guide the court when similar questions arise 
in the future.  
2.  Express Constitutional Assignment to a Non-Judicial Authority 
Courts have throughout Canadian jurisprudential history been reasonably 
consistent in acknowledging that certain questions and processes have been 
constitutionally assigned for determination by other branches of government. 
In cases arising out of the Meech Lake Accord, the Yukon and Northwest 
Territories separately challenged their exclusion from the process by which the 
premiers eventually agreed to submit resolutions for the amendment of the 
Constitution of Canada to their legislatures.35 In these cases, the courts eventu-
ally held that the Territories could not complain or seek judicial remedy for 
being excluded from the Meech Lake bargaining table despite political prom-
ises to the contrary. Dominant in the decisions of the courts in those two cases 
were the considerations that the mechanism for constitutional amendment is the 
tabling of a resolution before the legislatures; that a resolution is not a legisla-
tive act by itself but rather part of the mechanism for constitutional change, and 
that the courts ought not to interfere with the political judgments which are 
made as to the process and substance of proposed constitutional changes. 
The objection to judicial interference could not rest on the inability of the 
courts to apply legal standards. The Territorial governments alleged clear as-
surances of participation, and the allegations would certainly have been capable 
of being assessed as easily as any administrative law case involving a breach of 
the duty of fairness. It was the constitutional assignment of the process itself to 
the legislatures that was decisive.  
In other contexts lower courts have declined to interfere with the process of 
constitutional amendment. In Haig v. Canada36 the Court declined to interfere 
with the processes leading to, and the conduct of, the Charlottetown Accord 
Referendum. In Brown v. Alberta37 the Court declined to consider a constitu-
tional claim relating to the need for an elected senate. Similarly, the Supreme 
Court of Canada refused to consider a declaration concerning funding for 
                                                                                                                                                              
35
  Penikett v. R. (1987), 45 D.L.R. (4th) 108 (Y.T.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 
(1988), 46 D.L.R. (4th) vi (note) (S.C.C.); Sibbeston v. Canada, [1988] N.W.T.J. 1 (C.A.), online: 
QL (NWTJ). 
36
  (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (Ont. C.A.). 
37
  (1998), 64 Alta. L.R. (3d) 62 (Q.B.). 
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groups active in the process considering constitutional reform in Native 
Women’s Assn. of Canada v. Canada.38 This principle extends to the legislative 
process as well. As Sopinka J. stated in Reference re Canada Assistance Plan 
(British Columbia), “The formulation and introduction of a bill are part of the 
legislative process with which the courts will not meddle.”39 
In the Canadian context, therefore, the clearest examples of controversies as-
signed to be decided by the political branches acknowledged in the Constitution 
may be the consideration and passage of amendments to the Constitution and 
the formulation and introduction of legislation. 
Another example in the post-Charter era is New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. 
v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly)40 in 1993, in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the principle that the Speaker of the legisla-
tive assembly has and exercises certain privileges which have a constitutional 
status and are unaffected by the passage of the Charter. On the facts of that 
case, the Court declined to entertain a challenge based upon the freedom of 
expression to the Speaker’s exclusive control over the media’s access to de-
bates in the legislature. In this respect the Charter effected no change since both 
British and Canadian precedents supported the exclusion of judicial interfer-
ence in the exercise of the privileges of democratic assemblies.41 McLachlin J. 
(as she then was), for the majority, crafted an exemption from Charter scrutiny, 
but not immunity from judicial scrutiny over the lawful exercise of the privi-
leges of the House of Assembly.42 
The principle of constitutional assignment as an expression of the political 
questions doctrine has also been extended to statutory assignment in the non-
Charter jurisprudence of the Court. For example, in Canada (Auditor General) 
v. Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines & Resources),43 the Court held that a 
statutory provision entitling the Auditor General to report to Parliament any 
non-compliance with the disclosure provisions of the legislation rendered a 
dispute over non-disclosure non-justiciable in a court. According to the Court, 
dispute resolution over the matter had been assigned to Parliament. Dickson 
C.J. observed, “Ultimately, such judgment depends on the appreciation by the 
judiciary of its own position in the constitutional scheme.”44  
                                                                                                                                                              
38
  [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627. 
39
  [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, at 559. 
40
 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319. 
41
 E.g., Fielding v. Thomas, [1896] A.C. 600 (P.C.), concerning the contempt jurisdiction of 
the New Brunswick legislative assembly.  
42
 Supra, note 40, at 375. 
43
  [1989] 2 S.C.R. 49. 
44
  Ibid., at 91. 
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3. Appropriateness or Deference 
Aside from the area of express assignment to other branches of government, 
the Court has shown caution in declining to address an issue either because it is 
arguably inappropriate to judicial determination or because the Court’s answer 
might arguably constitute interference with the operations of another part of 
government.  
In its decisions, the Court has appeared content to address the suitability of 
political questions for decision by the general test of whether the controversy 
has a sufficient legal element. Thus in Reference re Canada Assistance Plan 
(British Columbia)45 the Court addressed the terms of federal-provincial agree-
ments on the basis that a form of contract had an adequate legal component to 
justify intervention by the “judicial branch” of government. This was contrasted 
to questions of inter-governmental negotiations or disagreements over funding 
levels, which would be characterized as “purely political” and, on this basis, 
would be non-justiciable.46 
The same test was at least implicitly applied in the References concerning 
the patriation of the Canadian Constitution and most recently, in expressing the 
legal principles applicable to secession from Canada.  
In Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution,47 three provinces asked the 
opinions of three Courts of Appeal and, on further appeals, the Supreme Court 
of Canada, as to both the legality of the proposed unilateral patriation of the 
Constitution as well as the question of whether a unilateral patriation would 
violate the constitutional conventions which had allegedly developed by reason 
of the practices followed respecting amendments by the Imperial Parliament to 
the British North America Acts over the preceding century. 
Only three judges would have declined to answer the question relating to 
constitutional conventions, despite the fact that constitutional conventions are 
by their character unenforceable in a court of law.  
The majority justified exercising their discretion to answer the questions on 
the basis that the questions were constitutional in their character and amenable 
to resolution employing the reference procedure.48 Certainly the issue of pro-
vincial participation in constitutional amendment arose out of historical facts 
that were not seriously disputed, even if the inferences to be drawn from those 
facts were hotly argued.49 The political circumstances of the references also 
supported the court answering the questions. But for the Court’s opinion, there 
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is little doubt that the federal government would not have sought a broader 
consensus among the provinces, nor would the British government have risked 
an international incident by second-guessing the federal government with re-
spect to the wisdom of proceeding unilaterally. In the final analysis the Court’s 
opinion appears to have impelled the federal-provincial settlement which ulti-
mately led to the successful patriation of the Constitution, save for Quebec’s 
significant refusal. In the subsequent Quebec Veto reference, the Court again 
agreed to answer the questions and confirmed the constitutional propriety of the 
patriation of the Constitution in the absence of Quebec’s agreement.50 
Almost two decades later, in Reference re Secession of Quebec,51 the Su-
preme Court provided opinions on the circumstances under which Quebec 
would be justified in constitutional and international law in establishing itself as 
a separate sovereign state. Once again, the Court was satisfied that it could 
address the questions, as in its view they were capable of providing the legal 
framework for the democratic decision over secession. In its reasoning, the 
Court acknowledged the importance of respecting its proper role in the democ-
ratic framework of government. The Court viewed the application of these 
principles to be best performed by assessing whether the extralegal aspects of 
the controversy were severable from the legal questions before the Court.52 This 
was certainly very different from the approach taken in the U.S. decision of 
Luther v. Borden, already referred to,53 concerning the legitimacy of the Rhode 
Island government.  
It is worth emphasizing that the Reference procedure itself reflects an impor-
tant difference between the American and Canadian contexts for applying a 
political questions doctrine. Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
providing an advisory opinion to the executive would exceed the Court’s con-
stitutionally assigned role,54 the Reference jurisdiction of the Canadian Su-
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preme Court has been upheld as constitutionally valid.55 This is one of several 
institutional features of Canada’s constitutional system that has led most ob-
servers to suggest that it is not characterized by a rigid separation of powers. 
However, even in the setting of References, the Canadian Supreme Court has 
been careful to articulate boundaries over its jurisdiction, insisting for example, 
that the question posed by the executive not be overly vague or hypothetical.56 
While the Court has mapped out a principled framework to guide its discre-
tion in declining jurisdiction on other grounds of justiciability,57 it has resisted 
providing a similar framework in the context of political questions. Although 
the degree of “legality” may be a useful means of assessing the Court’s ability 
to reach a reasoned conclusion, it does not address whether there are other 
reasons that render judicial intervention inappropriate or unwise. The Court 
considered whether it should exercise a residual discretion against answering 
the questions, but construed its jurisdiction to do so as limited to questions 
which are too imprecise to admit of an answer, or the Court has insufficient 
information to provide a reasoned answer.58 The decision made implicitly in the 
Patriation References by the majority was that a judicial answer to questions 
respecting constitutional convention would assist the process by holding the 
federal government to the consistent practice in the past without giving the 
provinces each a veto over patriation. However, the consequences of the judi-
cial conclusion were both short-term, and, by the nature of the patriation exer-
cise, not to be repeated.  
While the same concerns appear to have caused the Court to answer the ref-
erence questions in the Secession Reference, arguably very different circum-
stances were present. Although the Court appears to have gone to great pains to 
have provided something for both sides in the debate over the legitimacy of 
referenda, and to have signalled an unwillingness to judicially review the out-
come of any future contest, the very circumstances of the reference suggested 
that further requests for judicial intervention would be inevitable in the event of 
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a successful referendum campaign. Despite the Court’s carefully weighed 
statement that the issues of what would constitute a clear question or a clear 
majority would not be appropriate for judicial review, the very fact of the 
judgment has created the expectation of future judicial review. These Refer-
ences illustrate that the importance of a well-articulated political questions 
doctrine is not simply to justify when, and why, a Court should decline to adju-
dicate a matter, but also when, and why, the politics surrounding certain dis-
putes compel judicial intervention. While purporting to sever the legal from the 
political aspects of the Secession Reference, and then address only the legal, it 
is arguable that the Court did precisely the opposite. In either event, it is appar-
ent that the vagueness and subjectivity of the Secession Reference approach to 
political questions provides little in the way of a principled and predictable 
limit to the Court’s jurisdiction.  
4.  Choice of Judicial Remedy 
Although the issue of political questions is normally framed in the context of 
the Court’s exercising its discretion not to answer a question, similar considera-
tions may apply in the selection of judicial remedies for constitutional error. 
There may be circumstances where a judicial remedy may trespass upon legis-
lative prerogatives.59 
The two recent cases in which this question of a political question arose out 
of the choice of judicial remedy are those of Vriend v. Alberta,60 where the 
Court added sexual orientation to a list of groups protected by provincial civil 
rights legislation, and R. v. Sharpe,61 where the Court recently crafted two 
exceptions from criminality in order to provide adequate room for the exercise 
of freedom of speech. 
As a matter of the engagement between the two branches of government, 
Vriend is perhaps the most arguable case of the Court’s exercising a legislative 
office. The province of Alberta has no constitutional obligation to pass a human 
rights code, and section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not 
extend to private conduct. 
The majority judgment treated the character of the legislature’s decision in 
the following terms: 
[T]he purpose of the IRPA is the recognition and protection of the inherent dignity 
and inalienable rights of Albertans through the elimination of discriminatory prac-
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tices. It seems to me that the remedy of reading in would minimize interference 
with this clearly legitimate legislative purpose and thereby avoid excessive intru-
sion into the legislative sphere.62 
By reading into the provincial Human Rights Code63 an additional protection 
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the Court created a 
statutory right which was never debated nor passed by the legislature. In de-
fence of the Court’s choice of remedy, it could be argued that the alternative, 
namely, striking down the Human Rights Code, would have deprived many 
other people of valuable protection against violations of their human rights in 
Alberta. This conclusion assumes legislative inaction rather than legislative 
responsiveness, which may have been deterred by the Court’s choice of read-
ing-in. Perhaps the Court was of the view that the legislature had no choice but 
to pass a new law embracing its decision. Whatever would have occurred, there 
is little doubt that the Court effectively exercised a legislative power by its 
selection of judicial remedy.64 Indeed, as noted by Major, J. in dissent, the only 
available evidence was that the legislature was opposed to including sexual 
orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination.65 On his view, that opposi-
tion meant that it was inappropriate to read in: 
Reading in may be appropriate where it can be safely assumed that the legislature 
itself would have remedied the underinclusiveness by extending the benefit or pro-
tection to the previously excluded group.66 
In Sharpe, the Court’s reading-in remedy resulted in a Criminal Code67 of-
fence respecting child pornography which has been effectively revised by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Indeed, the defendant Sharpe proceeded to trial on 
charges based on the revised offence. In this case, however, it can scarcely be 
argued that Parliament would not have returned to the business of the legisla-
tion had the Court restricted itself to striking out the unconstitutional provisions 
of the Criminal Code. Again, the Court determined that it was appropriate to 
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read in, in order to render the law constitutional, by crafting two exceptions to 
the criminal prohibition 
[I]t seems reasonable to conclude that such [the exempted] materials are caught in-
cidentally, not deliberately, and that Parliament would have excluded these two 
categories from the purview of the law had it been seized of the difficulty raised by 
their inclusion.68  
By deciding to judicially revise the provision of the Criminal Code in the 
light of the Constitution, the Court arguably both exercised a legislative power 
and relieved Parliament of its political obligation to ensure that there was a 
constitutionally valid criminal sanction relating to child pornography. 
The majority judgment carefully analyzed the choices before it, including the 
option of declaring the law as a whole invalid. It considered the legislative 
history to ascertain whether its reading-in was consistent with what previously 
occurred. It did not expressly address whether Parliament would persist in its 
determination to restore the original law. In considering whether to strike down 
the entirety of the law, the fact that the debate when the matter returned to 
Parliament would be informed by the Court’s reasons as well as public reaction 
to it does not appear to have been a factor. The dissenting judges in Sharpe also 
identified various policy rationales for the legislation which might well have 
also motivated legislators on reconsideration of the legislation.69  
Perhaps the proper role of the Court was to identify the proper constitutional 
boundaries and leave it to Parliament to try again and pass a law which would 
not violate fundamental rights. In any event, however, consideration of the 
appropriateness of the reading-in remedy would benefit from a more sustained 
institutional analysis than that carried out to date by the Court. There is little 
satisfaction in conclusions about parliamentary intent since by the time of the 
challenge, it is a historical rather than current reality. It is precisely because the 
legislature’s reaction to a finding of unconstitutionality is unpredictable, and 
subject to a dynamic political process that is itself part of constitutional gov-
ernment, that it is best to leave the job of creating responsive legislation to the 
legislative branch. Legislators need to exercise responsibly their job of uphold-
ing constitutional values, and also need to be given the opportunity to do so.  
5. Guiding Principles 
Our hope is that the Court will draw together the various strands of thought 
in the decisions and express principles to guide future decisions. In our view 
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the categorization of issues as legal or extralegal is unhelpful and productive of 
obscurity rather than clarity. Similarly, labels such as “purely political” are not 
by themselves capable of principled application. 
This analysis suggests there is a clear body of case law which declines judi-
cial interference with processes expressly or impliedly assigned to other 
branches of government. We believe these precedents are for the most part well 
founded and ought to guide the Court in future when attempts to overlay judi-
cial standards or oversight inevitably arise.  
The difficult question of when a court should decline to act because of a 
concern about appropriateness has received no consistent answer in the authori-
ties. In our view, the most important lesson from the American experience and 
the Canadian authorities is that a clear discussion about whether a given issue is 
appropriate for judicial determination is valuable and adds to the proper context 
and quality of a decision. There are questions which courts are simply no better 
situated to address than the elected branches of government, and democracy is 
the poorer when the principal answers provided are judicially concluded. A 
Canadian political questions doctrine should respond to the distinctive skills 
and roles of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government and 
should support and not undermine the legislatures in their important and diffi-
cult work. 
V.  RECENT APPROACHES TO POLITICAL QUESTIONS  
IN CANADA 
In this section, we examine the present nature and scope of the Court’s im-
plicit political questions doctrine through two recent cases: United States v. 
Burns and Corbiere v. Canada. We next turn to a brief consideration of the 
Court’s active avoidance of this doctrine in the setting of judicial independence 
and court administration.  
1. United States v. Burns70 
The most interesting decision of the 2001 term touching upon the Court’s 
approach to cases involving political questions concerns the successful chal-
lenge to the Minister of Justice’s refusal to require as a condition of the extradi-
tion of two accused murderers to the United States that the United States 
undertake not to seek the death penalty in the event of conviction. 
This case may fit within an implied assignment model, if one was to apply 
the American jurisprudence which characterizes foreign policy decisions as 
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inherently political in character. Certainly the Court’s reasons are dominated by 
considerations of political trends, international relations and policy considera-
tions bearing on the negotiation of extradition treaties.  
In summarizing the sources of its conclusion with respect to the acceptability 
of the death penalty, the Court drew upon recent political history: 
While government policy at any particular moment may or may not be consis-
tent with principles of fundamental justice, the fact that successive governments 
and Parliaments over a period of almost 40 years have refused to inflict the death 
penalty reflects, we believe, a fundamental Canadian principle about the appropri-
ate limits of the criminal justice system.71  
The Court also drew upon the recent discovery of several significant miscar-
riages of justice in concluding: 
These miscarriages of justice [Guy Paul Morin, Thomas Sophonow, David Mil-
gaard, Donald Marshall, Junior] of course represented a tiny and wholly excep-
tional fraction of the workload of Canadian courts in murder cases. Still, where 
capital punishment is sought, the state’s execution of even one innocent person is 
one too many.72 
Finally, on the international plane, the Court concluded that there was an in-
ternational trend to abolition in the following terms: “[T]he trend to abolition in 
the democracies, particularly the Western democracies, mirrors and perhaps 
corroborates the principles of fundamental justice that led to the rejection of the 
death penalty in Canada.”73 
What is the nature of the question concerning whether extradition is required 
to include the extraction of assurances from other sovereign states? The Court 
unanimously and vigorously asserted that its role in the system of justice re-
quired and justified its intervention in the Minister’s exercise of discretion. It 
observed that the death penalty is a justice issue and the Court is the “guardian 
of the justice system.” The previous decisions of the Court in Reference re Ng 
Extradition (Canada)74 and Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice)75 both 
expressed deference to the political character of the Minister’s duties in relation 
to requesting assurances, but have now been replaced by the Court’s determina-
tion to infer constitutional restraints in light of the change in circumstances 
concerning the death penalty.76 In this sense United States v. Burns represents 
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greater judicial supervision in an area where a degree of deference previously 
existed.  
The Court’s approach shifted as a consequence of the revelations concerning 
wrongful convictions and its conclusions about the domestic and international 
trends away from recognizing the death penalty as a legitimate criminal sanc-
tion. Indeed, the Court concluded that it would constitute an abdication of its 
function if it were not to supervise this issue, as it was found to involve princi-
ples of fundamental justice.  
The Court is to be applauded for extensively and unanimously setting out its 
reasons concerning its role in terms which address the political question arising 
from the facts. 
If proof was needed of the observation that there are no clear boundaries in 
this area, Burns certainly provides it. Despite the Court’s solid marshalling of 
the facts against the wisdom of employing the death penalty either here or in 
the United States, none of them is without answer from the pro-death penalty 
position. Indeed, the very DNA evidence which has provided such shocking 
proof of the frailty of eyewitness evidence was also instrumental in the investi-
gation of Burns, and which included confessions obtained by an undercover 
RCMP investigation.  
There are powerful justifications for abolition absent evidence of wrongful 
convictions, but reliance on that evidence seems embroiled in the policy debate 
and also begs for the right to be adjusted according to the strength of the evi-
dence against the particular accused, which appears at odds with a conclusion 
founded on the death penalty being violative of principles of fundamental 
justice.  
                                                                                                                                                              
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 90 C.R.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.). In Suresh, 
the Court held that the deportation of a refugee who was a suspected terrorist, notwithstanding 
evidence that he would face torture if returned to his country of origin, was quashed on procedural 
grounds. The s. 7 argument that deporting to torture would in every case shock the conscience of 
Canadians, however, was rejected. The irony is that in Kindler, the Court had stated that extradition 
to face the death penalty would not shock the conscience of Canadians under the s. 7 standard, but 
contrasted this to the hypothetical situation of a person extradited to face torture, which would in 
the Court’s view violate s. 7 (per La Forest J., concurring). In Burns, the Court reversed course to 
conclude that extradition to face the death penalty would shock the conscience, while the next year 
in Suresh, the Court concluded that deporting to torture would not necessarily do so. In our view, it 
is only the unspoken presence of political questions considerations that reconciles these apparent 
contradictory pronouncements. In Suresh, specifically, these considerations related directly to the 
intervening terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, which was after the case had been argued but 
before the judgment was released. The judgment addresses those events directly in several passag-
es, including where the Court, writing per curiam, emphasized the special justification for defer-
ence to the executive where national security issues are at stake (at paras. 31-34). 
(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) Does Canada Need a Political 363 
 Questions Doctrine? 
 
Parliament prior to this decision was not required to invest a minister with 
the authority to require an assurance that an extradited person not be subject to 
the death penalty. The existence of the statutory discretion (flowing from the 
treaty) to seek this assurance provided an obvious platform upon which to 
attach a judicial remedy; however, what is the ultimate character of the Court’s 
remedy? The Court appeared sensitive to this and suggests that it may be un-
constitutional for Canada to enter into a treaty without that protection.77  
The suggestion that the Court’s conclusion might embrace a constitutional 
restraint on the treaty-making power raises the argument that this area is consti-
tutionally assigned to the executive and is political in its character. Although 
the Court stated that it was important not to give the Charter extra-territorial 
effect, its conclusion that the potential imposition by a foreign state of the death 
penalty did not give rise to a loss of mobility rights pursuant to section 6 or 
represent the imposition of a cruel or unusual punishment meant that it had to 
rely on the protections of section 7 as it relates solely to the process of extradi-
tion to anchor the constitutional right.  
Although many Canadians who are fiercely against the death penalty take 
comfort from the fact that it is exercised by many states whose other domestic 
policies we disapprove of, the list also includes countries such as the United 
States, which we would be hard pressed to characterize as uncivilized. This 
being said, the Court did not consider as controlling the distinction between 
Canadian domestic constitutional order and the general sovereignty of states to 
order criminal law and sanctions within their territory.  
The decision demonstrates that the Court is anxious that it be seen as legiti-
mately exercising a judicial function. In order to found a right, however, it had 
to, in essence, overrule the previous decisions which had both reflected the 
necessity for deference to the executive in relation to extradition matters, and 
especially policy.  
Whether requiring that the death penalty be foresworn raises any general 
strains in the relationship between Canada and the United States is difficult to 
foretell. In light of recent events, however, one can imagine difficulties if Can-
ada refused to allow the extradition of alleged terrorists involved in mass mur-
der within the United States.  
We suspect satisfaction with the result in this case follows traditional pro- 
and anti-death penalty lines. Although the Court’s concern over the legitimacy 
of its role is evident from the reasons, by determining the issue as a section 7 
Charter right the collective interests and utilitarian concerns which dominate 
international relations often at the expense of individual rights are excluded.  
                                                                                                                                                              
77
  Supra, note 5, at 359. 
364  Supreme Cout Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
2.  Corbiere v. Canada 
The role of political questions in the determination of constitutional rights 
was also prominent in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern 
Affairs).78 Although the form of the constitutional question related to a section 
15 challenge to provisions of the Indian Act,79 the substance of the debate was 
as to the definition of the franchise for Indian band government in Canada. 
The Court’s conclusion appears to have been that a residential qualification 
for voting has become outdated by reason of the changes in demography 
amongst members of Indian bands. In particular, the Court rested its finding on 
constitutionality on the significant and growing body of persons who as a result 
of being non-resident members of the band were disenfranchised. The obvious 
inequity of non-residents being unable to vote when band government assigned 
housing and other on reserve benefits sharpened the injustice of the residential 
qualification for the franchise.80 
What is unclear, however, is whether the Court would have concluded that a 
residential qualification could have been upheld had the demographics been 
different. Was the result constitutionally required upon the passage of the Char-
ter, or was it the consequence of changed political circumstances?81  
While amendments to the Indian Act have been very difficult to achieve, a 
notable change arising out of the Charter was the passage of amending legisla-
tion to ensure redress for persons who had lost Indian status by reason of dis-
crimination based on sex. However, this process went through extensive 
consultation and legislative drafting such that the outcome is a complex legal 
structure including some band control over membership and most certainly 
went far beyond merely addressing the issue of sexual discrimination.  
Would the obvious inequity of continuing the residential requirement not 
have brought about political pressure for legislative intervention? Would the 
legislative process have resulted in the same outcome achieved by the Court? Is 
the outcome achieved by the Court the best solution for Indian communities, or 
would a legislative process have enabled Indian communities to influence those 
legislative decisions in a manner which respected the different interests of on-
reserve and off-reserve band members? 
It appears that bands have very different demographics with respect to the 
portion of their community who are off-reserve members. In other contexts, the 
Court has been deferential to the desire of First Nations to achieve a degree of 
self-government in relation to band government. However, in relation to the 
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very definition of the franchise for band elections, the Court refused to defer to 
the parliamentary process. 
3.  Judicial Independence and Court Administration 
The basis for a political questions doctrine is the separation of powers. While 
recent discussions of the Court which refer to the separation of powers have not 
been limited to the setting of judicial independence and court administration,82 
it has been in these settings that the Court’s concern for its own place in the 
constitutional system most explicitly informs its decision making.  
Decisions regarding the salary of public servants, the funding of courthouses, 
and related resource issues in the administration of courts are inherently politi-
cal, and in this sense no different from the funding of social welfare, education 
or health care. However, while courts have taken a largely deferential position 
to the decision making of the political branches of government in these fields, 
those same judges have been markedly interventionist when it comes to deci-
sions with an impact on courts.83 For example, when faced with a decision in 
British Columbia to close 24 courthouses, the chief provincial court judge took 
the extraordinary measure of sending a letter to the Attorney General, in ad-
vance of any legal challenge, to announce that “the judiciary has reached the 
conclusion that the government’s financial decision to close courthouses is 
unlawful, since it was made without consultation and without due consideration 
of the principle of access to justice.”84 In Alberta, the Chief Justice of the Al-
berta Court of Appeal unilaterally closed one of that Court’s two courthouses 
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because the justices deemed it unsafe and the resources provided to address the 
problems insufficient.85  
The Supreme Court’s treatment of political decisions with an impact on 
courts reflects a similarly activist posture with respect to political questions 
which have an impact on judicial independence and court administration. In the 
Provincial Court Judges Remuneration Reference, the Court relied on section 
11(d) of the Charter, sections 96-99 of the Constitution Act, 186786 and the 
unwritten guarantee of judicial independence contained in the Preamble to the 
Constitution Act, 1867, as sources for the constitutional protection of judicial 
independence. The content of that protection includes the protection of security 
of tenure, the protection of financial security and the protection of judicial 
administration, which extends, at a minimum, to those administrative functions 
central to the adjudicative process such as control over a court’s docket.87 Its 
farthest-reaching holding in that case was to remove decision making over 
financial benefits from the executive branch altogether and hand it instead to an 
independent commission. 
The Court’s vigilance over decision making in this area was most vividly 
demonstrated by its recent judgment in Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of 
Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick.88 In those companion cases, the Supreme 
Court applied the framework from the Provincial Court Judges Remuneration 
Reference to a challenge by provincial court judges in New Brunswick which 
repealed their right to elect supernumerary status. The previous legislation 
establishing supernumerary status did not specify particular workload arrange-
ments. The Court, however, accepted uncontradicted evidence showing that it 
was understood by everyone that a supernumerary judge received salary and 
benefits equal to that of a full-time judge, but only had to perform approxi-
mately 40 percent of the usual workload of a judge of the Provincial Court.89 
The legislation relating to supernumerary judges was silent concerning the 
extent of reduction of workload, but the conditions of eligibility for the office 
of supernumerary judge fully reflected the conditions of eligibility for payment 
of a retirement pension equal to 60 percent of salary. The Court characterized 
the supernumerary judges’ arrangement as a financial benefit which was taken 
away. Because that financial benefit was removed directly, and not decided by 
recourse to an independent body as dictated by the Provincial Judges Remu-
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neration Reference, Gonthier J., writing for the majority, found no distinction in 
principle between a straight salary cut and the elimination of the offices of super-
numerary judges, and consequently concluded that the law violated the constitu-
tional principle of judicial independence.90  
Writing for the dissent Binnie J., concluded that the repeal of  
the legislation providing for supernumerary status did not violate the require-
ments of judicial independence, because the benefit at issue was a discretionary 
one, not one mandated by the legislation or  
legally enforceable by supernumerary judges.91 The minority concluded that the 
existence (or repeal) of discretionary benefits does not threaten judicial inde-
pendence and that the disappointed expectations of judges, however under-
standable, did not justify a finding of unconstitutionality. Binnie J. reiterated 
that judicial independence exists as a protection for the judged, not for the 
judges. 
The effect of cases such as Mackin and the Provincial Court Judges Remu-
neration Reference has been to mark off a discrete set of political decisions 
(i.e., spending decisions with an impact on courts or judges) and to convert 
them into legal questions through the device of section 11 of the Charter on the 
one hand, and the Judicature and Preamble provisions of the Constitution Act, 
1867, on the other. While the legal basis for this intervention in the political 
sphere would appear to exist even if there were no Charter guarantees, it is not 
coincidental that the jurisprudence on judicial independence, beginning with 
Valente, appears after the enactment of the Charter, and the deeper entangle-
ment of courts in the policy-making process.  
As alluded to above, another significant consequence of this political entan-
glement, which is particularly apparent in the sphere of judicial independence, 
is the new emphasis on Canada’s separation of powers doctrine. While the 
Court has long recognized that the judiciary, executive and legislative branches 
of government have separate roles,92 only after the enactment of the Charter has 
the Court wrestled with the implications of this doctrine for Canada’s constitu-
tional system. To the extent that this doctrine has found recognition by the 
Court (indeed, Lamer C.J. referred to the separation of powers as the “back-
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bone” of Canada’s constitutional system),93 it has been by judicial fiat — as 
Peter Hogg, among others, has noted, the Constitution itself does not indicate 
that each branch of government exercise only “its own” function.94 
The Court revisited the separation of powers, and its own role in delineating 
the boundaries of this doctrine, in Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia 
(General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch).95 In Ocean Port, 
the Court ruled that administrative tribunals, as elements of the executive 
branch of government, do not enjoy the constitutional requirement of institu-
tional independence as courts do. The fact that many tribunals perform the 
same adjudicative tasks as courts, or that the consequences of their decisions 
for affected parties may be equally as significant as courts, was not the issue in 
the Court’s eyes. Rather, as McLachlin C.J. made clear, writing for the Court, 
the executive “spans the constitutional divide” between the courts and the 
legislature.96 The Court characterized the status of tribunals (even adjudicative 
ones) as first and foremost a form of “policy making,” while courts alone pos-
sess the “inherent jurisdiction” over resolving disputes in an impartial and 
independent forum.97  
This discussion of the Court’s decision making on its own place in the sepa-
ration of powers shows how the Court’s unique role as interpreter of Canada’s 
constitutional system shelters prudential and often strategic political decision-
making behind a veneer of legal reasoning. The Court’s reasoning, moreover, 
because it is “legal,” is without accountability. Whereas it is open to a govern-
ment to enact laws notwithstanding portions of the Charter if there are compel-
ling political reasons for doing so, the unwritten principles relied on by the 
Court in elaborating its own, exclusive sphere of decision making in relation to 
judicial independence and court administration cannot be modified, challenged 
or trumped by the political branches. While the courts and legislatures may 
engage in a dialogue on Charter rights, when it comes to the application of a 
political questions doctrine, the Court always has the last word. This is why, in 
our view, the Court owes a duty of public trust to be both transparent and co-
herent when it comes to justifying this decision making. As we have attempted 
to demonstrate in the analysis above, this is a duty which the Court has yet to 
satisfactorily discharge.  
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VI.  THE FUTURE 
Cases raising the nature and scope of Canada’s political questions doctrine 
will continue to arise. Hopefully they will not concern the legitimacy of a na-
tional election as occurred in Bush v. Gore,98 or the actual results of a secession 
referendum as contemplated by the Secession Reference.99  
It is likely that the two areas of continued activity will be friction between 
the different branches of government and the development of new constitu-
tional rights under the Charter. As to the former, it is hoped that the Court in 
future will expressly address whether the judicial method is either appropriate 
or more skilled in determining the substantive issue than the executive or the 
legislature. As to the latter, we hope that the Court will expressly address the 
determination of constitutional remedy and the boundaries of constitutional 
rights in a way that permits the democratic process to remain engaged in social 
issues that are not amenable to questions of proof or legal reasoning.  
In the Court’s current term, however, it must address the issue of the poten-
tial collision between Charter values and school board democracy in Chamber-
lain v. Surrey School District No. 36.100 Similarly, the question of whether the 
federal law of marriage is unconstitutional on the basis that it discriminates on 
the basis of sexual orientation is being litigated in three provinces and has led 
the first judge to express discomfort in judicially determining the appropriate 
definition for this unit of society in light of the cultural, moral, religious and 
historical dimensions of the question.101 Finally, the Court returns to the ques-
tion of judicial independence in Ell v. Alberta,102 which examines whether the 
reach of the doctrine extends to justices of the peace, and to the implications of 
Ocean Port,103 which it will explore in C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Ministry of La-
bour).104 There will undoubtedly be more opportunities for the Supreme Court 
to establish guiding principles for itself and all Canadians. 
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